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ZamWallet Buy Crypto with Card

Latest release: 3.0.0 ( 17th June 2022 ) 🔍 Last analysed 4th November 2021 . No source for current release found
4.4 ★★★★★
66 ratings
17th October 2018

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Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

(Analysis from Android review)

Note: This app shares a logo with Zamzam - money transfers No Wallet . However, these apps do not have the same developer. This app’s developer is ZamZam Technology, while the other Zamzam’s app developer is Zamzam Tech. They do not have the same developer page.

Update on Note October 26, 2021: We were able to verify the link between these two apps via a document found on Zam.io’s document page: The other is for Russia, this here for the rest of the world.

App Description

The app allows users to buy, store, send, receive and manage crypto assets. It is described as both a CeFi and DeFi wallet.

  • Buy Crypto with card
  • Easily exchange crypto
  • Send crypto by phone number
  • Deposit fiat money to your account for low fees
  • Get identity verification in minutes
  • World-class security

The wallet has its own token $ZAM.

The Site

Terms and Conditions (PDF)

The User acknowledges that the Company may restrict User access to the Website in the form of service termination or service suspension, or otherwise the prohibition of the User from entering the Website or accessing any contents of the Website.

There is no mention of private key, mnemonics or seed-phrases.

AML/KYC (PDF)

Zam files SARs (Suspicious Activity/Currency Transaction Reports).

More information pertaining to the wallet

Our team is building a universal wallet for CeFi and DeFi that brings the best features of both technologies into one powerful app Users can choose whether to store their private keys in our custody secured by Binance, or keep them at their possession with full control over security and seemlessly swap between wallets.

Documentation is available for the self-custodial Zam DeFi wallet

Details about Zam’s self-custodial version ‘DeFi Wallet’ is available on this page.

The App

We downloaded and tried to register an account but was not able to. We did not receive the SMS-OTP code. We were not able to access the wallet’s features.

Verdict

This wallet claims to have two versions or modes: CeFi (custodial) and DeFi (self-custodial). We searched Github for the Zam appID of zam.wallet but did not find a relevant repository related to the Zam wallet.

There is a linked repository which appears to be a self-custodial prototype for a wallet api.

The description reads as follows:

A safe wallet to store, manage, send, and receive digital assets. Users need an easy way to access and manage their digital assets. ZamWallet is an application for iOS and Android that allows users to store, access, manage, send, and receive crypto directly from their mobile phones.

We could not find the source for the app as reported in gitlab issue #367.

The linked github org don’t contain repo that publish sources for mobile apps, didn’t opened related issue on some of their github repos.

(dg)

Verdict Explained

Without public source of the reviewed release available, this product cannot be verified!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

No Source!

Is the source code publicly available?

If the answer is "no", we mark it as "No source for current release found".

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.