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Savl Wallet: Web3 & Crypto

Latest release: 3.5.0 ( 11th October 2022 ) 🔍 Last analysed 11th September 2021 . No source for current release found
4.4 ★★★★★
264 ratings
22nd April 2018

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Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

(Analysis from Android review)

Account personalization with the ability to restore access. All the Savl wallets operations and data are protected by a unique 12-word key.

Savl provides the private keys. Found on the official website:

IMPORTANT: Savl has no way to access users’ private keys. Private keys are only stored on the user’s device in encrypted form. If you lose access to your Savl account, the 12-word string, or private key, generated during registration will be needed to recover your account. Keep your private key in a safe place and do not share it with anyone. Savl staff will never ask for your private key.

From the Terms and Conditions, Section 3.4 Transactions via the “Wallet”:

The Wallet allows you to access your wallets within the respective Blockchains and to send Digital Assets from those wallets to other wallets within the same Blockchains. At no point will the Company ever take custody of Digital Assets traded via the Wallet.

We cannot find the source code for the wallet client using its Google play appID.

Upon closer inspection of savL’s Client Agreement document

You undertake not to:(a)copy,redistribute,publish,reverseengineer,decompile,disassemble,modify,translateormakeany attempt to access the source code to create derivative works of the source code, or otherwise;

This wallet is a self custodial wallet, but without the source code for the wallet, it is not verifiable.

(dg)

Verdict Explained

Without public source of the reviewed release available, this product cannot be verified!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Is the source code publicly available?

If the answer is "no", we mark it as "No source for current release found".

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.