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OneKey - Limited Edition

🔍 Last analysed 5th January 2022 . No source for current release found

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Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

OneKey is an open source hardware wallet by Bixin. The primary language for the website is Chinese. OneKey, the company claims to be based in Singapore

Private keys are created offline - ✔️

From the FAQ

Number 5. The private keys of OneKey are all created offline, avoid cyber attacks completely. The physical buttons and display screen can provide complete protection even if the computer or mobile phone is implanted with malicious viruses, the transaction information needs double check on hardware device then signed for release. Software side cannot tamper it， private key is more secure throughout.

Private keys are not shared with OneKeyHQ - ✔️

OneKey claims that the private keys are only controlled by the user

Wallet helpers and seeds created with OneKey are stored locally and encrypted, so only you can decrypt the information, and our servers do not and cannot store any of the user’s private data. No more centralized institutions, you are in full control of your encrypted assets.

Device displays receive address for confirmation - ✔️

Tutorial on how to withdraw coins to OneKey

OneKey has a 1.54 Inch OLED with 128 x 64 pixels.

From the renderings provided on this page, the OneKey hardware wallet has a confirmation button.

However, this is from the official documentation. We were not able to find third-party content such as pictures or videos on social media or blogs that depicts the actual device.

Interface

Activating the wallet starts with the device providing the mnemonics and then securing it with a pin.

The wallet activation tutorial can be found here.

Incorrectly entering the pin code 10 times, resets the wallet.

The wallet can then be connected to the OneKey Desktop client or through a browser plug-in.

Code and Reproducibility

OneKey claims that their software code and firmware codes are open source:

All codes are open source
Transparent, WYSIWYG

Sadly their repository redirects to “OneKeyHQ/wallet-deprecated” which contains no source code and no mention of “firmware”.

There is another repo called OneKeyHQ/firmware (11396 commits) which is a fork of trezor-firmware (10805 commits).

Their OneKey hardware wallet firmware upgrade tutorial looks familiar to how Trezor One Reproducible Review Outdated! works but with a Bluetooth firmware option. The screenshots and lack of discussion of such a feature imply there is no way of seeing a hash of the about to be installed firmware. Neither could we find the signed binary releases.

We opened an issue in the otherwise empty issue tracker of the most likely candidate for being the source code repository of this product but until confirmation of tis, we have to file this product as closed source as their website doesn’t link to any actual firmware source code. As such the product is not verifiable.

(ml, dg, lw)

Verdict Explained

Without public source of the reviewed release available, this product cannot be verified!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

No Source!

Is the source code publicly available?

If the answer is "no", we mark it as "No source for current release found".

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.