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Monya - Monacoin & Altcoins Wa

Latest release: 3.10.5 ( 14th December 2021 ) 🔍 Last analysed 11th November 2021 . Not reproducible from source provided
1 thousand
2nd January 2018

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The Analysis 

App Description

Crypto currency wallet that supports Monacoin, Bitcoin, Counterparty and many other currencies, and that satisfies both beginners and advanced users.

Easy

  • This makes difficult crypto aspects easy.
  • You don’t need email address or another private information.

Multi currency

  • Bitcoin-based coins such as Bitcoin, Dash, Litecoin supported
  • Counterparty, Monaparty, Monacard are supported.
  • Not only XEM but also NEM Mosaic available
  • Ethereum , ERC 20 Tokens are also supported.
  • You can also send and receive XRP.
  • You can even add a new currency.

Security conscious

  • Private key is stored in only your device. So it is much higher than online wallet.
  • Easy backup methods
  • BIP44 HD wallet
  • Complete open source

The Site

Their site is a Github hosted website.

The App

We tried the app. Some portions of it were in Japanese, although you can choose to receive your mnemonics in English. After the user is provided with a passphrase, the app asks you to set a password. You can add several other cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin. It is possible to send and receive Bitcoin.

Verdict

This app is self-custodial. However, upon attempting to verify this code, we got the following:

Building version 3.10.4 and comparing it to version from google-play, result in below diff:
Command: diff --recursive --brief ./monya_local_build_3.10.4_2/ ./monya-from-google-play

Result:

Files ./monya_local_build_3.10.4_2/AndroidManifest.xml and ./monya-from-google-play/AndroidManifest.xml differ
Files ./monya_local_build_3.10.4_2/assets/www/dist/0.dist.js and ./monya-from-google-play/assets/www/dist/0.dist.js differ
Files ./monya_local_build_3.10.4_2/assets/www/dist/dist.js and ./monya-from-google-play/assets/www/dist/dist.js differ
Only in ./monya-from-google-play/META-INF: GOOGPLAY.RSA
Only in ./monya-from-google-play/META-INF: GOOGPLAY.SF
Files ./monya_local_build_3.10.4_2/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF and ./monya-from-google-play/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF differ
Files ./monya_local_build_3.10.4_2/resources.arsc and ./monya-from-google-play/resources.arsc differ

This app is unreproducible.

(dg)

Verdict Explained

We could not verify that the provided code matches the binary!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Unreproducible!

Is the published binary matching the published source code?

If the answer is "no", we mark it as "Not reproducible from source provided".

Published code doesn’t help much if it is not what the published binary was built from. That is why we try to reproduce the binary. We

  1. obtain the binary from the provider
  2. compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary
  3. compare the two binaries
  4. we might spend some time working around issues that are easy to work around

If this fails, we might search if other revisions match or if we can deduct the source of the mismatch but generally consider it on the provider to provide the correct source code and build instructions to reproduce the build, so we usually open a ticket in their code repository.

In any case, the result is a discrepancy between the binary we can create and the binary we can find for download and any discrepancy might leak your backup to the server on purpose or by accident.

As we cannot verify that the source provided is the source the binary was compiled from, this category is only slightly better than closed source but for now we have hope projects come around and fix verifiability issues.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.