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O3 Wallet

Latest release: 3.3.2 ( 24th May 2022 ) 🔍 Last analysed 30th September 2021 . No source for current release found
4.8 ★★★★★
474 ratings
10 thousand
27th August 2020

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Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

Google Play

From the Play Store description:

A 100% non-custodial and multi-chain wallet with a friendly interface and high security. Aim to build a leading crypto wallet to make exchange, stake, storage & buy simple and safe. As the earliest light wallet in Neo ecology. We currently support Bitcoin, Ethereum, Neo, Ontology, Polkadot, Binance Smart Chain, and Huobi ECO Chain.

App

To verify this we installed the app. Users may import existing crypto wallets by entering the mnemonic or private key, and upon creating a new wallet you are given the option to immediately back it up and copy the 12-word phrase.

Homepage

On the homepage, O3 claims:

O3 is an open source project, dedicated to making the vision of the Smart Economy a reality.

The Github account has a repository named OzoneWalletIOS. However this repository is for the IOS version of the app.

Verdict

Notably, the last commit on its repository was dated September 12, 2019. On the other hand, as of this day the Play Store app was last updated on July 1, 2021.

According to the our methodology

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update.

Therefore, since the O3 repository does not even include the Google Play source code for their app and only has the IOS version which was last updated two years ago we have to label this as a wallet with no source.

(dg)

Verdict Explained

Without public source of the reviewed release available, this product cannot be verified!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

No Source!

Is the source code publicly available?

If the answer is "no", we mark it as "No source for current release found".

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.