Wallet Logo

Koinbazar: Crypto Exchange App

Latest release: 1.34 ( 29th August 2022 ) 🔍 Last analysed 4th October 2021 . Custodial: The provider holds the keys
3.8 ★★★★★
7090 ratings
100 thousand
17th May 2021

Jump to verdict 

Help spread awareness for build reproducibility

Please help us spread the word discussing the risks of centralized custodians with Koinbazar: Crypto Exchange App  via their Twitter!

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

App Description

INR (Indian Rupee) deposit and withdrawal as well as trading cryptocurrencies such as BTC, ETH, XRP and more are available.

The Site

Like most custodial services, sign up is available on the app as well as the website. AML and KYC provisions are also in place.

Terms and Conditions

Section 9 of the Terms and Conditions confirms that this is a custodial service.

YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT OUR DECISION TO TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS, INCLUDING LIMITING ACCESS TO, SUSPENDING, OR CLOSING YOUR ACCOUNT OR WALLET, MAY BE BASED ON CONFIDENTIAL CRITERIA THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO OUR RISK MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY PROTOCOLS. YOU AGREE THAT KOIN BAZAR IS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE THE DETAILS OF ITS RISK MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY PROCEDURES TO YOU.

The App

We tried the app. Once installed we registered and were able to successfully join the platform. The ‘Wallet’ sub menu allows Deposit/Withdrawal of INR, BTC and many other cryptocurrencies.

Verdict

By most indications, this centralized cryptocurrency exchange is a custodial service and not verifiable

(dg)

Verdict Explained

As the provider of this product holds the keys, verifiability of the product is not relevant to the security of the funds!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Is the product self-custodial?

If the answer is "no", we mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys".

A custodial service is a service where the funds are held by a third party like the provider. The custodial service can at any point steal all the funds of all the users at their discretion. Our investigations stop there.

Some services might claim their setup is super secure, that they don’t actually have access to the funds, or that the access is shared between multiple parties. For our evaluation of it being a wallet, these details are irrelevant. They might be a trustworthy Bitcoin bank and they might be a better fit for certain users than being your own bank but our investigation still stops there as we are only interested in wallets.

Products that claim to be non-custodial but feature custodial accounts without very clearly marking those as custodial are also considered “custodial” as a whole to avoid misguiding users that follow our assessment.

This verdict means that the provider might or might not publish source code and maybe it is even possible to reproduce the build from the source code but as it is custodial, the provider already has control over the funds, so it is not a wallet where you would be in exclusive control of your funds.

We have to acknowledge that a huge majority of Bitcoiners are currently using custodial Bitcoin banks. If you do, please:

  • Do your own research if the provider is trust-worthy!
  • Check if you know at least enough about them so you can sue them when you have to!
  • Check if the provider is under a jurisdiction that will allow them to release your funds when you need them?
  • Check if the provider is taking security measures proportional to the amount of funds secured? If they have a million users and don’t use cold storage, that hot wallet is a million times more valuable for hackers to attack. A million times more effort will be taken by hackers to infiltrate their security systems.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.